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TANLEY K STOLL

(801) 322-9146

Clerk. Supreme Court. Utah

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

Lewis Duncan, et a L , v s . Union
Pacific Railroad and the State of Utah
(Department of Transportation), et al.
Case No. 900233

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
defendant/respondent Utah Department of Transportation directs the Court ! s
attention to a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court entitled
United States v . Gaubert, Case No. 89-1793, decided March 26, 1991, and reported
at 59 United States Law Week, p . 4244, copy attached. The case holds that
certain activities of the United States Government are immune from suit pursuant
to the "discretionary function" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U . S . C . § 2680, and involves, in our opinion, a helpful discussion relating
to those types of activities and decisions which are discretionary in n a t u r e ,
and for which the governmental entity is immune. We direct the Court's attention
particularly to the discussion of the discretionary function exception found at
p p . 4246-4247 of the attached. This new opinion of the United States Supreme
Court relates to Point II of the defendant's brief, particularly as it bears on
the issue of the previously stated inclination of the Utah Supreme Court to "follow
the lead of cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . ", Frank v . State,
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), cited at p . 17 of defendant's brief.
We are also advised that the 1991 Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 218
entitled "An Act Relating to Governmental Immunity; Clarifying the Scope and
Coverage of Governmental Immunity; and Making Technical Corrections." Senate
Bill 218 made a number of changes in the Governmental Immunity Act, most notably
in § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or
dangerous conditions of highways, bridges or other s t r u c t u r e s . Both at oral
argument and in Point II of our brief ( p p . 17-22), we argued that Section 8,
which waives immunity for the "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any
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highway
, of necessity had to be modified by the discretionary function
exception to the waiver of liability found in § 63-30-10, and that if it were
otherwise, t h e r e would be the potential for almost strict liability on the p a r t of
governmental entities for accidents occurring on a public road. Senate Bill 218
amended § 63-30-8 by making its waiver of immunity specifically subject to the
exceptions to waiver set forth in § 63-30-10. While § 11 of Senate Bill 218 provides
that it has prospective effect only, nevertheless the amendments clearly set forth
what the 1991 Legislature believes to be the proper relationship between §§ 8 and
10 of the Governmental Immunity Act; we submit, however, that the 1991 amendment is consistent with and supportive of the legislative intent of previous
legislatures and earlier Utah appellate decisions, including Velasquez v . Union
Pacific Railroad C o . , 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970); Gleave v . Denver and Rio Grande
Western R . R . , 749 P.2d 660 (Ut. App. 1988); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v .
Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); and Bigelow v . Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50
(Utah 1980), and related discussion at p p . 7-16 of r e s p o n d e n t s brief. A copy of
the amendments to Sections 63-30-8, 9 and 10 are attached.

I t r u s t you will advise if counsel can be of any further assistance in
ensuring that the Court is fully advised before finally deciding this most important
case.
Very truly yours, (

ALLAN LULARSOIN
ALL: mc
Enclosures: U . S . v. Gaubert
Governmental Immunity Act Amendments
cc:

Michael A. Katz, Esq.
J. Clare Williams, Esq.
(with enclosures)
Mr. Lee B a r r
James R. Soper, Esq.
(without enclosures)
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the crime than the first was admitted in evidence and found
to be free of any constitutional objection. Accordingly, I
would affirm the holding of the Supreme Court of Arizona in
its initial opinion, and reverse the judgment which it ultimately rendered in this case.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I agree
that Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola was not coerced. In my view, the trial court did not err in admitting
this testimony. A majority of the Court, however, finds the
confession coerced and proceeds to consider whether harmless-error analysis may be used when a coerced confession
has been admitted at trial. With the case in this posture, it
is appropriate for me to address the harmless-error issue.
Again for the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I
agree that harmless-error analysis should apply in the case of
a coerced confession.
That said, the court conducting a
harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a
full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished,
for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that
incriminates the defendant only when connected with other
evidence. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted
the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on
that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the
other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence
more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of innocence.
For the reasons given by JUSTICE WHITE in Part IV of his
opinion, I cannot with confidence find admission of Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola to be harmless error.
The same majority of the Court does not agree on the three
issues presented by the trial court's determination to admit
Fulminante's first confession: whether the confession was inadmissible because coerced; whether harmless error analysis
is appropriate; and if so whether any error was harmless
here. My own view that the confession was not coerced does
not command a majority.
In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona
Supreme Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept
in the case now before us the holding of five Justices that the
confession was coerced and inadmissible. I agree with a majority of the Court that admission of the confession could not
be harmless error when viewed in light of all the other evidence; and so I concur in the judgment to affirm the ruling of
the Arizona Supreme Court.
BARBARA M. JARRETT, Arizona Senior Assistant Attorney General (ROBERT K. CORBIN, Ariz. Atty. Gen., and JESSICA GIFFORD FUNKHOUSER, on the briefs) for petitioner; PAUL J.
LARKIN JR., Assistant to Solicitor General (KENNETH W.
STARR. Sol Gen.. EDWARD S.G. DENNIS JR., Asst Atty. Gen.,
WILLIAM
C. BRYSON, Dpty. Sol
Gen., JOEL M
GERSHQWITZ. Justice Dept. atty., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus
curiae; STEPHEN R. COLLINS, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.

No. 89-1793
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMAS M.
GAUBERT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
No. 89-1793.

Argued November 26, 1990-Decided March 26. 1991

When the events in this case occurred, the Home Owners' Loan Act authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to proscribe
rules and regulations providing **for the organization, incorporation,
examination, and regulation" of federal savings and loan associations,
and to issue charters, "giving primary consideration to the best practices
of thrift institutions in the United States." 12 U. S. C. 11464(a). Pursuant to the Act, the FHLBB and the Federal Home Loan Bank-Dallas
(FHLB-D) undertook to advise about and oversee certain aspects of
the operation of Independent American Savings Association (IASA), but
instituted no formal action against the institution. At their request,
respondent Gaubert, chairman of the board and IASA's largest stockholder, removed himself from IASA's management and posted security
for his personal guarantee that IASA's net worth would exceed regulatory minimums. When the regulators threatened to close IASA unless
its management and directors resigned, new management and directors
were recommended by FHLB-D. Thereafter, FHLB-D became more
involved in IASA's day-to-day business, recommending the hiring of
a certain consultant to advise it on operational andfinancialmatters;
advising it concerning whether, when, and how its subsidiaries should be
placed into bankruptcy; mediating salary disputes; reviewing the draft
of a complaint to be used in litigation; urging it to convert from state to
federal charter, and intervening when the state savings and loan department attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA. The new directors soon announced that IASA had a substantial negative net worth,
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) assumed receivership of the institution. After his administrative tort
claim was denied, Gaubert filed an action in the District Court against
the United States under the Federal Ton Claims Act (FTCA), seeking damages for the lost value of his shares and for the property forfeited under his personal guarantee on the ground that the FHLBB and
FHLB-D had been negligent in carrying out their supervisory activities.
The court granted the Government's motion to dismiss on the ground
that the regulators' actions fell within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, 2S U. S. C. § 2680(a). The Court of Appeals reversed
in part. Relying on Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61.
the court found that the claims concerning the regulators' activities after
they assumed a supervisory role in IASA's day-to-day affairs were not
"policy decisions," which fall within the exception, but were "operational
actions," which do not.

Held:
1. The discretionary function exception covers acts involving an element of judgment or choice if they are based on considerations of public
policy. It is the nature of the conduct rather than the status of the actor
that governs whether the exception applies. In addition to protecting
policymaking or planning functions and the promulgation of regulations
to carry- out programs, the exception also protects Government agents'
actions involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the
social, economic, or political goals of a statute and regulations. If an
employee obeys the direction of a mandatory regulation, the Government will be protected because the action will be deemed in furtherance
of the policies which led to the regulation's promulgation; and if an
employee violates a mandator}' regulation, there will be no shelter from
liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to policy. On the other hand, when established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines,
allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, there is a strong presumption that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising
that discretion.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discretionary function exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or management level of IASA. There is nothing in the description of a discretionary act that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions.
Day-to-day management of banking affairs regularly requires judgment
as to which of a range of permissive courses is the wisest. Neither
Dalehite v. Vvited States, 346 U. S. 15, Indian Towing, supra, nor Berkovitz v. United States, 468 U. S. 531, supports Gaubert's and the Court
of Appeals' position that there is a dichotomy between discretionary
functions and operational activities.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that some of the acts alleged
in Gaubert's Amended Complaint were not discretionary acts within the
meaning of § 26S0^a). The challenged actions did not go beyond "normal
regulatory activity." They were discretionary, since there were no formal regulations governing the conduct in question, and since the relevant statutory provisions left to the agency's judgment when to institute
proceedings against afinancialinstitution and which mechanism to use.
Although the statutes provided only for formal proceedings, they did

not prevent regulators from supervising I ASA b> informal means, a
view held by the FHLBB, FHLBB Resolution No 82-381
Gaubert's
argument that the actions fall outside the exception because they involved the mere application of technical skills and business expertise
was rejected when the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision was
disapproved The FHLBB's Resolution, coupled with the relevant statutory provisions, established governmental policy which is presumed to
ha\e been furthered when the regulators undertook day-to-da} operational decisions
Each of the regulators' actions was based on pubbc
policy considerations related either to the protection of the FSLIC's
insurance fund or to federal oversight of the thrift industry
Although
the regulators used the power of persuasion to accomplish their goals
neither the pervasiveness of their presence nor the forcefulness of their
recommendations is sufficient to alter their actions' supervisory nature
8S5 F 2d 1284, reversed and remanded
WHITE. J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C J , and MARSHALL BLACKMUN. STEVENS O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and

Sot'TER, JJ , joined
judgment

SCALIA, J , filed an opinion concurring in the

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court

When the events in this case occurred, the Home Owners'
Loan Act, 12 U. S C §§ 1461-1470,' provided for the chartering and regulation of federal savings and loan associations
(FSLA's). Section 1464(a) authorized the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) "under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation" of
FSLA's, and to issue charters, "giving primary consideration
to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United
States "* In this case the FHLBB and the Federal Home
Loan Bank-Dallas (FHLB-D)8 undertook to advise about and
oversee certain aspects of the operation of a thrift institution
Their conduct in this respect was challenged b) a suit against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U S C §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq (FTCA),4 asserting that the
FHLBB and FHLB-D had been negligent in earning out
their supervisory activities
The question before us is
whether certain actions taken by the FHLBB and FHLB-D
are within the "discretionary function" exception to the liability of the United States under the FTCA The Court of Ap1
Subsequent to the events at issue here and in response to the current
crisis in the thrift industn, Congress enacted comprehensive changes to
the statutory scheme concerning thrift regulation b> means of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recover}, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), Pub L 101-73, 103 Stat 183 FIRREA abolished the
FHLBB and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), two of the agencies at issue here, and repealed the statuton provisions governing those agencies' conduct §§ 401, 407, 103 Stat 354-357,
363 At the same tune, it granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the newlj established Office of Thrift Supervision discretional-} enforcement authority similar to that enjojed by the former
agencies §§201 301, 103 Stat 187-188 277-343
1
Section 1464(a^ stated in full
"In order to provide thrift institutions for the deposit or investment of
funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and services, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it ma}
prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as Federal savings and
loan associations, or Federal savings banks, and to issue charters therefor
giving priman consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in
the United States The lending and investment authorities are conferred
b\ this section to provide such institutions the fle\ibiht> necessan to
maintain their role of providing credit for housing "
•FHLB-D was one of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB's) estabbshed by the FHLBB pursuant to 12 U S C § 1423 The FHLBB was
specifically empowered to authorize the performance by FHLB personnel
of "am function" of the FHLBB except for adjudications and the promulgation of rules and regulations
12 U S C § 1437u)
* The FTCA, subject to various exceptions waves sovereign lmmunit}
from suits for negligent or wrongful acts of Government emplo>ees

peals for the Fifth Circuit answered this question in the negative. We have the contrary view and reverse
I
This FTCA suit arises from the supervision by federal
regulators of the activities of Independent American Savings
Association (IASA), a Texas-chartered and federally insured
savings and loan. Respondent Thomas A. Gaubert was
IASA's chairman of the board and largest shareholder. In
1984, officials at the FHLBB sought to have IASA merge
with Investex Savings, a failing Texas thrift. Because the
FHLBB and FHLB-D were concerned about Gaubert's other
financial dealings, they requested that he sign a "neutralization agreement" which effectively removed him from IASA's
management. They also asked him to post a $25 million interest in real property as security for his personal guarantee
that IASA's net worth would exceed regulatory minimums
Gaubert agreed to both conditions Federal officials then
provided regulator}' and financial advice to enable IASA to
consummate the merger with Investex Throughout this period, the regulators instituted no formal action against IASA
Instead, they relied on the likelihood that IASA and Gaubert
would follow their suggestions and advice
In the spring of 1986, the regulators threatened to close
IASA unless its management and board of directors were replaced, all of the directors agreed to resign The new officers and directors, including the chief executive officer
who was a former FHLB-D employee, were recommended by
FHLB-D After the new management took over, FHLB-D
officials became more involved in IASA's day-to-day business They recommended the hiring of a certain consultant
to advise IASA on operational and financial matters, they advised IASA concerning whether, when, and how its subsidiaries should be placed into bankruptcy, they mediated salary
disputes, the> reviewed the draft of a complaint to be used in
litigation, they urged IASA to convert from state to federal
charter, and they actively intervened when the Texas Savings and Loan Department attempted to install a supervisor)
agent at IASA
In each instance, FHLB-D's advice was
followed
Although IASA was thought to be financially sound w hile
Gaubert managed the thrift, the new directors soon announced that IASA had a substantial negative net worth
On May 20, 1987, Gaubert filed an administrative tort claim
with the FHLBB, FHLB-D, and FSLIC. seeking $75 million
in damages for the lost value of his shares and $25 million for
the property he had forfeited under his personal guarantee h
That same day, the FSLIC assumed the receivership of
IASA After Gaubert's administrative claim was denied six
months later, he filed the instant FTCA suit in United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking
$100 million m damages for the alleged negligence of federal
officials in selecting the new officers and directors and in participating in the day-to-day management of IASA The District Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the United
States, finding that all of the challenged actions of the regulators fell within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA, found m 28 U. S C. § 2680(a)6
'Gauben was required b\ statute to seek relief from the agencies prior
to ftkng an FTCA suit See 2S U S C § 2675
•Citing 12 U S C 5 1464, the court determined that the FHLBB had
broad discretionary authont} to regulate the savings and loan industn
Although acknowledging that most of Gaubert's allegations involved the
regulators' activity prior to the date of receivership, the court stressed
that had the regulators invoked their statutory authority to place IASA in
receivership earlier, all of the challenged actions would have fallen within
the exception The court also pointed out that had IASA and Gaubert
failed to cooperate with the regulators receivership likely would ha\e fol-
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part 885 F. 2d 1284 (1989) Relying on
this Court's decision in Indian Towing Co v United States,
350 U. S 61 (1955), the court distinguished between "policy
decisions," which fall within the exception, and "operational
actions," which do not 885 F 2d, at 1287 After claiming
further support for this distinction in this Court's decisions in
United States v S A Empresa de Vvacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varxg Airlines), 467 U. S 797 (1984), and Berkomtz
v United States, 486 U S 531 (1988), the court explained
"The authority of the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas to take
the actions that were taken in this case, although not
guided by regulations, is unchallenged The FHLBB
and FHLB-Dallas officials did not have regulations telling them, at every turn, how to accomplish their goals
for IASA, this fact, however, does not automatically
render their decisions discretionary and immune from
FTCA suits Only policy oriented decisions enjoy such
immunity Thus, the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas officials were only protected by the discretionary function
exception until their actions became operational in nature and thus crossed the line established m Indian
Towing " 885 F 2d, at 1289 (citations and footnote
omitted)
In the court's view, that line was crossed when the regulators "began to advise IASA management and participate in
management decisions " Id , at 1290 Consequently, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of
the claims which concerned the merger, neutralization agreement, personal guarantee, and replacement of IASA management, but reversed the dismissal of the claims which concerned the regulators' activities after they assumed a
supervisory role in IASA's day-to-day affairs We granted
certiorari, 496 U S
(1990), and now reverse
II
The liability of the United States under the FTCA is subject to the various exceptions contained in §2680, including
the "discretionary function" exception at issue here That
exception provides that the Government is not liable for
"[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Go\ernment, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused " 28 U S C
§ 2680(a)
The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in nature, acts that "mvolv[e] an element of judgment or choice,"
Berkomtz, supra, at 536, see also Dalehte v United States
346 U S 15, 34 (1953), and "it is the nature of the conduct,
rather than the status of the actor," that governs whether
the exception applies Vang Airlines, supra, at 813 The
requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a

lowed sooner In the District Court s view, "[t]he fact that [Gaubert] cooperated when he could have refused will not give [him] a cause of action
where he otherwise would have none " App to Pet for Cert 24a-25a
Moreover because the decision to place IASA in receivership involv ed the
exercise of discretion the decision iwt to do so at an earlier date was necessarih discretionary as well The court viewed the decision to supervise
IASA s activities first bv informal means as an extension of the discretional-) decision to postpone receivership
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course of action for an employee to follow," because "the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive "
Berkomtz, 486 U S , at 536
Furthermore, even "assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment," it remains to be decided
"whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary
function exception was designed to shield " Ibid See
Varip Airlines, 467 U S , at 813 Because the purpose of
the exception is to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in
tort," id , at 814, when properly construed, the exception
"protects only governmental actions and decisions based on
considerations of public policy " Berkomtz, supra, at 537
Where Congress has delegated the authority to an independent agency or to the executive branch to implement the
general provisions of a regulatory* statute and to issue regulations to that end, there is no doubt that planning-level decisions establishing programs are protected by the discretionary' function exception, as is the promulgation of regulations
by which the agencies are to carry out the programs In addition, the actions of Government agents involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the social, economic,
or political goals of the statute and regulations are protected
Thus, in Dalehite, the exception barred recovery for claims
arising from a massive fertilizer explosion The fertilizer
had been manufactured, packaged, and prepared for export
pursuant to detailed regulations as part of a comprehensive
federal program aimed at increasing the food supply in occupied areas after World War II 346 U S , at 19-21 Not
only was the cabinet-level decision to institute the fertilizer
program discretionary, but so were the decisions concerning
the specific requirements for manufacturing the fertilizer
Id , at 37-38 Nearly 30 years later, in Vang Airlines, the
Federal Aviation Administration's actions m formulating and
implementing a "spot-check" plan for airplane inspection
were protected by the discretionary function exception because of the agency's authority to establish safety standards
for airplanes 467 U S , at 815 Actions taken in furtherance of the program were likewise protected, even if those
particular actions were negligent Id , at 820 Most recently, in Berkomtz, we examined a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the licensing of laboratories to
produce polio vaccine and the release to the public of particular drugs 486 U S . at 533 We found that some of the
claims fell outside the exception, because the agency employees had failed to follow the specific directions contained in the
applicable regulations, i e , in those instances, there was no
room for choice or judgment Id , at 542-543 We then remanded the case for an analysis of the remaining claims in
light of the applicable regulations Id , at 544
Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation
mandates particular conduct, and the employee obeys the direction, the Government will be protected because the action
will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the
promulgation of the regulation See Dalehite, supra, at 36
If the employee violates the mandator} regulation, there will
be no shelter from liability because there is no room for
choice and the action will be contrary to policy On the other
hand, if a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very
existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that
a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation
of the regulations
Not all agencies issue comprehensive regulations, however
Some establish policy on a case-by-case basis,
whether through adjudicatory proceedings or through administration of agency programs Others promulgate regula-
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tions on some topics, but not on others In addition, an
agency may rely on internal guidelines rather than on published regulations In any event, it will most often be true
that the general aims and policies of the controlling statute
will be evident from its text
When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a
Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion For a complaint to survive a motion
to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a finding
that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that
can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute
or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on
whether they are susceptible to policy analysis 7
III
In light of our cases and their interpretation of § 2680(a), it
is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or
management level of the bank involved m this case A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment, there
is nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions Day-to-day management of
banking affairs, like the management of other businesses,
regularly require judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses is the wisest Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level "[I]t is the nature of
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs
whether the discretionary function exception applies in a
given case " Vang Airlines, supra, at 813
In Vang Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration
had devised a system of "spot checking" airplanes We held
that not onl> was this act discretionary but so too w ere the
acts of agenc\ employees in executing the program since the)
had a range of discretion to exercise in deciding how to carr>
out the spot-check activity 467 U S , at 820 Likewise in
Berkowtz, supra, although holding that some acts on the operational level were not discretionary and therefore were
without the exception, ue recognized that other acts, if held
to be discretionary on remand would be protected 486
U S , at 545
The Court's first use of the term "operational" in connection with the discretionary function exception occurred in
Dalehite, where the Court noted that "[t]he decisions held
culpable w ere all responsibly made at a planning rather than
operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government's fertilizer
program " 346 U S , at 42 Gaubert relies upon this statement as support for his argument that the Court of Appeals
applied the appropriate analysis to the allegations of the
Amended Complaint, but the distinction in Dalehite was
merely description of the level at which the challenged conduct occurred There was no suggestion that decisions made
at an operational level could not also be based on polic)
'There are obviously discretionary acts performed b\ a Government
agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the discretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said to be based
on the purposes that the regulator} regime seeks to accomplish If one of
the officials involved in this case drove an automobile on a mission con
nected with his official duties and negligently colbded with another car the
exception would not apph Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion the official s decisions in exercising that discretion can
hardh be said to be grounded in regulator) policy
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Neither is the decision below supported by Indian Towing
There the Coast Guard had negligently failed to maintain a
lighthouse by allowing the light to go out The United
States was held liable, not because the negbgence occurred at
the operational level but because making sure the light was
operational "did not involve any permissible exercise of policy
judgment " Berkovitz, supra, at 538, n 3 Indeed, the
Government did not even claim the benefit of the exception
but unsuccessfully urged that maintaining the light was a
governmental function for which it could not be liable The
Court of Appeals misinterpreted Berkovitz1 s reference to Indian Towing as perpetuating a nonexistent dichotomy between discretionary functions and operational activities
885 F 2d, at 1289 Consequently, once the court determined that some of the actions challenged by Gaubert occurred at an operational level, it concluded, incorrectly, that
those actions must necessarily have been outside the scope of
the discretionary function exception
IV
We now inquire whether the Court of Appeals was correct
in holding that some of the acts alleged in Gaubert's
Amended Complaint were not discretionary acts within the
meaning of § 2680(a) The decision we review was entered
on a motion to dismiss We therefore "accept all of the factual allegations in [Gaubert's] complaint as true" and ask
whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to sur\i\e a
motion to dismiss Berkontz, supra, at 540
The Court of Appeals dismissed several of the allegations
in the Amended Complaint on the ground that the challenged
activities fell within the discretionary function exception
These allegations concerned t4the decision to merge IASA
with Investex and seek a neutralization agreement from
Gaubert," as well as "the decision to replace the IASA Board
of Directors with FHLBB approved persons and the actions
taken to effectuate that decision " 885 F 2d, at 1290
Gaubert has not challenged this aspect of the court's ruling
Consequently, we review onl> those allegations in the
Amended Complaint which the Court of Appeals view ed as
surviving the Government's motion to dismiss
These claims asserted that the regulators had achie\ ed * a
constant federal presence" at IASA App 14 c 33 In describing this presence, the Amended Complaint alleged that
the regulators "consulted] as to da> -to-da\ affairs and operations of IASA," id , at 14, c33a, "participated in management
decisions" at IASA board meetings, id , at 14, r33b. "became
involved in giving advice, making recommendations, urging,
or directing action or procedures at IASA," id , at 14 r33c
and "advised their hand-picked directors and officers on a % anet} of subjects", id , at 14, T34 Specifically, the complaint enumerated seven instances or kinds of objectionable
official involvement First, the regulators "arranged for the
hiring for IASA of
consultants on operational and financial matters and asset management " Id , at 14, c34a Second, the officials "urged or directed that IASA convert fiom
a state-chartered savings and loan to a federally-chartered
savings and loan in part so that it could become the exclusn e
government entity with power to control IASA " Id , at 14,
c
34b Third, the regulators "gave ad\ice and made recommendations concerning whether, when, and how to place
IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy " Id , at 15, r34c
Fourth, the officials "mediated salary disputes between
IASA and its senior officers " Id , at 15, c34d Fifth, the
regulators "reviewed a draft complaint in litigation" that
IASA s board contemplated filing and were "so actneh involved in giving advice, making recommendations, and directing matters related to IASA's litigation policy that the\
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were able successfully to stall the Board of Directors' ultimate decision to file the complaint until the Bank Board in
Washington had reviewed, advised on, and commented on
the draft." Id , at 15, H34e (emphasis in original) Sixth,
the regulators "actively intervened with the Texas Savings
and Loan Department (IASA's principal regulator) when the
State attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA "
Id , at 15, c34f Finally, the FHLB-D president wrote the
IASA board of directors "affirming that his agency had
placed that Board of Directors into office, and describing
their mutual goal to protect the FSLIC insurance fund "
Id , at 15-16, T34g. According to Gaubert, the losses he suffered were caused by the regulators' "assumption of the duty
to participate in, and to make, the day-to-day decisions at
IASA and [the] negligent discharge of that assumed duty "
Id , at 17, f 39. Moreover, he alleged that "[t]he involvement of the FHLB-Dallas in the affairs of IASA went beyond
its normal regulatory- activity, and the agency actually substituted its decisions for those of the directors and officers of the
association " Id , at 19, f 55
We first inquire whether the challenged actions were discretionary, or whether the) were instead controlled by mandator} statutes or regulations Berkomtz, 486 U S . at 536
Although the FHLBB, which oversaw the other agencies at
issue, had promulgated extensive regulations which were
then in effect, see 12 CFR §§500-591 (1986). neither part}
has identified formal regulations governing the conduct in
question As already noted, 12 U S C § 1464(a) authorizes
the FHLBB to examine and regulate FSLA's, "giving primary consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions
in the United States " Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals recognized that the agencies possessed
broad statutory authority to supervise financial institutions "
The relevant statutory provisions were not mandatory, but
left to the judgment of the agency the decision of when to institute proceedings against a financial institution and which
mechanism to use For example, the FSLIC had authont}
to terminate an institution's insured status, issue cease-anddesist orders, and suspend or remove an institution's officers,
if "in the opinion of the Corporation" such action was warranted because the institution or its officers were engaging in
an "unsafe or unsound practice" in connection with the business of the institution
12 U S C §§173CKDM), (e)d).
(g)(1) The FHLBB had parallel authority to issue ceaseand-desist orders and suspend or remove an institution's officers §§ 1464(2)(A), (4)(a) Although the statute enumerated specific grounds warranting an appointment b} the
FHLBB of a conservator or receiver, the determination of
whether any of these grounds existed depended upon "the
opinion of the Board " § 1464(6)(A) The agencies here
were not bound to act in a particular wa), the exercise of
their authont} involved a great "element of judgment or
choice " Berkoatz, supra, at 536
We a^e unconvinced by Gaubert's assertion that because
the agencies did not institute formal proceedings against
IASA. the} had no discretion to take informal actions as the}
did Although the statutes provided only for formal proceedings there is nothing in the language or structure of the
statutes that prevented the regulators from invoking less formal means of supervision of financial institutions Not onlv
was there no statutor} or regulator} mandate which compelled the regulators to act in a particular way, but there was
no prohibition against the use of supervisor} mechanisms not
specifically set forth in statute or regulation
'As explained aoo\e the agencies a* issue here have since been abolished although the> have been replaced b\ agencies possessing similar discretionary authorr\ See n 1 supra
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This is the view of the FHLBB, for in a resolution passed
in 1982, the FHLBB adopted "a formal statement of policy
regarding the Bank Board's use of supervisory actions,"
which provided in pa^t:
"In carrying out its supervisor}' responsibilities with
respect to thrift institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ( T S L I C ) , . . . it is
the policy of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that
violations of law or regulation, and unsafe or unsound
practices will not be tolerated and will result in the initiation of strong supervisory and/or enforcement action by
the Board It is the Bank Board's goal to minimize, and
where possible, to prevent losses occasioned by violations or unsafe and unsound practices by taking prompt
and effective supervisory' action. . . .
"The Board recognizes that supervisory actions must
be tailored to each case, and that such actions will vanaccording to the severity of the violation of law or regulation or the unsafe or unsound practice, as well as to the
responsiveness and willingness of the association to take
corrective action The following guidance should be
considered for all supervisory actions
"In each case, based upon an assessment of management's willingness to take appropriate corrective action
and the potential harm to the institution if corrective
action is not effected, the staff must weigh the appropriateness of available supervisory actions If the potential harm is slight and there is a substantial probability that management will correct the situation,
informal supervisor}* guidance and oversight is appropriate If some potential harm to the institution or its
customers is likely, a supervisory agreement should be
promptly negotiated and implemented If substantial
financial harm may occur to the institution, its customers, or the FSLIC and there is substantial doubt that
corrections will be made promptly, a cease-and-desist
order should be sought immediately through the Office
of General Counsel " FHLBB Resolution No 82-381
(Ma} 26, 1982), reprinted in Brief for Respondent 4a-6a
From this statement it is clear that the regulators had the
discretion to supervise IASA through informal means, rather
than invoke statutor}' sanctions 9
Gaubert also argues that the challenged actions fall outside
the discretionary function exception because they involved
the mere application of technical skills and business expeitise Brief for Respondent 33 But this is just another wa}
of saying that the considerations involving the da}-to-dav
management of a business concern such as IASA are so precisely formulated that decisions at the operational lev el never
involve the exercise of discretion within the meaning of
§ 2680(a), a notion that we have already rejected in disapproving the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision It
may be that certain decisions resting on mathematical calculations, for example, involve no choice or judgment in carrying out the calculations, but the regulator}* acts alleged
here are not of that genre Rather, it is plain to us that each
of the challenged actions involved the exercise of choice and
judgment
We are also convinced that each of the regulatory actions m
question involved the kind of policy judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield The
•We not* that in a recent opinion b> Judge Garza who also wrote the
opinion at issue here the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to
extend its decision in Gaubert to impose habilit\ on the FDIC for failure *o
institute statuton receivership proceedings against a thrift See Fedeiv!
Deposit hmiravct Corp \ Mmahat 907 F 2d 546 552 (CAS 1990)

FHLBB Resolution quoted above, coupled with the relevant
statutory provisions, established governmental policy which
is presumed to have been furthered when the regulators exercised their discretion to choose from various courses of action in supervising IASA Although Gaubert contends that
day-to-day decisions concerning IASA's affairs did not implicate social, economic, or political policies, even the Court of
Appeals recognized that these day-to-day "operational" decisions were undertaken for policy reasons of primary concern
to the regulator}' agencies
a

[T]he federal regulators here had two discrete purposes
in mind as they commenced dav-to-day operations at
IASA First, they sought to protect the solvency of the
savings and loan industry at large, and maintain the public's confidence in that industry Second, they sought to
preserve the assets of IASA for the benefit of depositors
and shareholders, of which Gaubert was one " 885 F
2d, at 1290
Consequently, Gaubert's assertion that the day-to-day involvement of the regulators with IASA is actionable because
it went beyond "normal regulator} activity" is insupportable
We find nothing in Gaubert's Amended Complaint effectively alleging that the discretionary acts performed bv, the
regulators were not entitled to the exemption By Gaubert's
own admission, the regulators replaced IASA's management
in order to protect the FSLIC's insurance fund, thus it cannot
be disputed that thus action was based on public policy considerations The regulators actions in urging IASA to convert
to federal charter and in intervening with the state agencv
were directl) related to public pohc} considerations regarding federal o\ ersight of the thrift industry So w ere advising the hiring of a financial consultant, advising when to place
IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy, intervening on IASA's
behalf with Texas officials, advising on litigation policy, and
mediating salar} disputes There are no allegations that the
regulators ga\ e anything other than the kind of advice that
was within the purview of the policies behind the statutes
There is no doubt that in advising IASA the regulators
used the power of persuasion to accomplish their goals
Nevertheless, we long ago recognized that regulators have
the authority to use such tactics in supervising financial
institutions
In United States v Philadelphia Xatwna!
Bank, 374 U S 321 (1963), the Court considered the wide
array of supervisor} tools available to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve Svstem in
overseeing banks Noting the "frequent and intensive" nature of bank examinations and the "detailed periodic reports"
banks were required to submit, the Court found that "the
agencies maintain virtually a day-to-dav, surveillance of the
American banking system " Id , at 329 Moreover, the
agencies ability to terminate a bank's insured sta'u^ and mvoke other less drastic sanctions meant that "recommendations bv. the agencies concerning banking practices tend to be
followed bv, bankers without the necessity of formal compliance proceedings " Id , at 330 These statements applv
with equal force to supervision by federal agencies of the savings and loan industry More than 30 vears ago. the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made similar observations in a
case involving allegations that the FHLBB had improperly
pressured a savings and loan < directors to resign See
Miami Beach Federal Sauna* & Loan Association v
Callander, 256 F 2d 410 (CA5 195S) The court noted that
"[w]hen a governmental agencv holds such great power* ovei
its offspring, even to the point of appointing a conservator oi
receiver to replace the management
. it i* difficult to hold
that an informal request, even demand, to clean hou>e would
amount to an aDuse of the <natutorv powers and discretion of

the agency " Id , at 414-415 Consequently, neither the
pervasiveness of the regulators' presence at IASA nor the
forcefulness of their recommendations is sufficient to alter
the supervisor}' nature of the regulators' actions
In the end, Gaubert's Amended Complaint alleges nothing
more than negligence on the part of the regulators Indeed,
the two substantive counts seek relief for "negligent selection
of directors and officers" and "negligent involvement in dayto-day operations " App 17, 18 Gaubert asserts that the
discretionary function exception protects only those acts of
negligence which occur in the course of establishing broad
policies, rather than individual acts of negligence which occur
in the course of day-to-da> activities Brief for Respondent
39 But we have already disposed of that submission See
supra, at 9 If the routine or frequent nature of a decision
were sufficient to remove an otherwise discretionary act from
the scope of the exception, then countless policy-based decisions b> regulators exercising day-to-day supervisory authority would be actionable This is not the rule of our
cases

I

V

Because from the face of the Amended Complaint, it is apparent that all of the challenged actions of the federal regulators involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of
public policv goals, the Court of Appeals erred m failing to
find the claims barred by the discretionary function exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act We therefore reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion
It is so ordered

concurring
I concur m the judgment and in much of the opinion of the
Court I wTite separately because I do not think it necessary to analyze individually each of the particular actionchallenged by Gaubert. nor do I think an individualized analysis necessarily leads to the results the Court obtains
JUSTICE SCALIA.

I
The so-called discretionarv function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) doe^ not protect all governmental activities involving an element of choice Berkox dz
v Unded States, 486 U S 531, 536-537 (19SS) The choice
must be "grounded in social, economic, [or] political policv,'
United States v Yang Airlines, 467 U S 797 814 (19^4\
or. more briefly, nlust represent a "policv judgment," Bcrkovitz, 486 U S ,fett537 Unfortunatelv, lower courts have
had difficult} in applying this test
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded thar a choice
involves policv judgment (in the relevant sense) if it is maar
at a planning rather than an operational level within the
agenc> 885 F £d 1284, 1287 (19S9) I agree with the
Court that this is wrong I think, howevei. that the level a:
which the decision is made is often relevant to the discretion
an, function inquiry, since the answer to that mquirv turnon both the subject matter and the office of the deciMon
maker In mv view a choice is shielded from habihtv bv the
discretional*} function exception if the choice is. under the
particular circumstances, one that ought to be informed bv
considerations of social, economic, or political policv and is
made bv, an officer whose official responsibilities include assessment of tho^e consideration^
This test, bv looking not onl> to the deacon but also to the
officer who made it, recognizes that there is something to the

planning vs. operational dichotomy—though the "something"
is not precisely what the Court of Appeals believed Ordinarily, an employee working at the operational level is not
responsible for policy decisions, even though policy considerations may be highly relevant to his actions The dock foreman's decision to store bags of fertilizer in a highly compact
fashion is not protected by this exception because, even if he
carefully calculated considerations of cost to the government
versus safety, it was not his responsibility to ponder such
things, the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to the same
effect is protected, because weighing those considerations is
his task Cf Dalehite v United States, 346 U. S 15 (1953)
In Indian Tomng Co v. United States, 350 U S 61 (1956),
the United States was held liable for, among other things,
the failure of Coast Guard maintenance personnel adequately
to inspect electrical equipment in a lighthouse, though there
could conceivably be policy reasons for conducting onlj superficial inspections, the decisions had been made by the
maintenance personnel, and it was assuredly not their
responsibiht} to ponder such things This same factor explains wh} it is universall} acknowledged that the discretionary function exception never protects against liability for the
negligence of a vehicle driver See ante, at S, n 7 The
need for expedition vs the need for safety may well represent a policy choice, cf Dalehite, supra, but the government
does not expect its drivers to make that choice on a case-b}case basis
Moreover, not only is it necessary for application of the discretionary function exception that the decisionmaker be an
official who possesses the relevant polic} responsibility, but
also the decisionmaker's close identification with policymaking can be strong evidence that the other half of the test is
met —z e , that the subject-matter of the decision is one that
ought to be informed b} polic} considerations I am much
more inclined to believe, for example, that the manner of
storing fertilizer raises economic polic} concerns if the decision on that subject has been reserved to the Secretary of
Agriculture himself That it is proper to take the level of the
decisionmaker into account is supported bv, the phrase of the
FTCA immediately preceding the discretional-} function exception, which excludes governmental liability for acts taken,
"exercising due care, in the execution of a
regulation,
whether or not such
regulation be valid " We have
taken this to mean that regulations "[can] not be attacked
bv, claimants under the Act " Dalehite, 346 U S , at 42
This immunity represents an absolute statutory presumption, so to speak, that all regulations involve polic} judgments that must not be interfered with I think there is a
similar presumption, though not an absolute one, that decisions reserved to policv,-making levels involve such judgments—and the higher the policy-making level, the stronger
the piesumption
II
Turning to the facts of the present case, I find it difficult to
sa> that the particular activities of which Gaubert complains
are necessarily discretionary functions, so that a motion to
dismiss could properl} be granted on that ground To take
but one example, Gaubert alleges that the regulators acted
negligently m selecting consultants to advise the bank The
Coun argues that such a decision, even though taken in the
course of "da}-to-day" management, surelv, involves an element of choice But that answers onl\ the first half of the
Berkovitz mquirv. It remains to be determined w hether the
choice is of a policymaking nature Pei haps one can imagine
a relative}} high- level government official, authorized generalh to manage the bank in such fashion as to further applicable government policies, who hires consultants and other

employees with those policy objectives in mind. The discretionary function exception arguably mould protect such a
hiring choice But one may also imagine a federal officer of
relatively low level, authorized to hire a bank consultant by
applying ordinary standards of business judgment, and not
authorized to consider matters of government policy in the
process That hiring decision would not be protected by the
discretionary function exception, even though some element
of choice is involved
I do not think it advances the argument to observe, ante,
at 16, that "[t]here are no allegations that the regulators gave
anything other than the kind of advice that was within the
purview of the policies behind the statutes " An official ma}
act "within the purview" of the relevant policy without himself making policy decisions—in wThich case, if the action is
negligent (and was not specifically mandated by the relevant
policy, see Dalehite, 346 U S at 36), the discretionary function exception does not bar United States Lability Contrariwise, action "outside the purview" of the relevant polic}
does not necessarily fail to qualify for the discretionary function defense If the action involves policy discretion, and the
officer is authorized to exercise that discretion, the defense
applies even if the discretion has been exercised erroneously,
so as to frustrate the relevant policy See 28 U S C
§ 2680(a) (discretionary function exception applies "whether
or not the discretion involved be abused ") In other w^ords,
action "within the purview" of the relevant policy is neither a
necessar} nor a sufficient condition for invoking the discretional-}' function exception
The present case comes to us on a motion to dismiss
Lacking any sort of factual record, we can do little more than
speculate as to whether the officers here exercised polic}makmg responsibility with respect to the individual acts in
question Without more, the motion would have to be denied I think, however, that the Court's conclusion to the
contrar} is properly reached under a slightly different approach The alleged misdeeds complained of here w ere not
actuall} committed by federal officers Rather, federal officers "recommended" that such actions be taken, making it
clear that if the recommendations were not followed the bank
would be seized and operated directly b} the regulators In
effect, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) imposed the advice which Gaubert challenges as a condition of
allowing the bank to remain independent But surel} the
decision w hether or not to take over a bank is a polic} -based
decision to which habihtv ma} not attach —a decision that
ought to be influenced b} considerations of "social, economic,
[or] political polic}," Vang Airhnes 467 U S , at 814. and
that in the nature of things can onl} be made b} FHLBB officers responsible for w eighmg such considerations I think a
corollary is that setting the conditions under which the
FHLBB will or will not take over a bank is an exercise of
policymaking discretion B} establishing such a list of conditions, as was done here, the Board in effect announces guidelines pursuant to which it will exercise its discretional*} function of taking over the bank Establishing guidelines for the
exercise of a discretionary function is unquestionabh a discretionary function Thus, without resort to item-b}-item
analysis, I would find each of Gaubert's challenges barred b}
the discretionary function exception
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(ii)

the

injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in

Subsection 63-30-36 (3)(c).
(4)
entity

An employee may be joined in an action

against

a

in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of

is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but
may

governmental

no

employee

be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the

performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
under

color

of

authority,

unless

or

it is established that the employee

acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
Section 2.

Section 63-30-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted

by

Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
63-30-8.
unsafe,

Waiver

or

of

dangerous

immunity

for

condition

injury

of

caused

highways,

by

defective,

bridges,

or

other

structures.
[immani-ty] Unless the injury

arises

out

of

one

or

more

of

the

exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe,

or

dangerous

condition

of

any

highway, road, street, alley,

crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct^ or other structure
located [thereon] on them.
Section 3.

Section 63-30-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted

by

Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
63-30-9.

Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective

public building, structure, or other public improvement —
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Exception,
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[fmnmnity]

Unless

the

injury

arises

out

of

one

or more of the

exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of
all governmental
dangerous

entities

is

waived

for

any

injury

caused

from

a

or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam,

reservoir^ or other public

improvement,

[immunity—is—not—waived—for

iatent-defeetive-conditions-]
Section 4.

Section

63-30-10, Utah

Code

Annotated

1953, as last

amended by Chapters 15 and 319, Laws of Utah 1990, is amended to read:
63-30-10.

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or

omission of employee —

Exceptions.

Immunity from suit of
injury

proximately

all

governmental

entities

is

waived

for

caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee

committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises

out

of:
(1)

the

exercise

perform a discretionary

or

performance

function,

or .the

whether

or

failure
not

to exercise or

tfhe

discretion

is

abused;
(2)

assault,

battery,

false

prosecution, intentional trespass,
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imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
abuse

of

process,

libel,

slander,

interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish,

or violation of civil rights;
(3)
failure

the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation
or

refusal

to

issue,

deny,

suspend,

or

of

or

revoke any permit,

license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
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(4)

a failure to make an inspection or by making

an

inadequate

or

negligent inspection [of-any-property];
(5)

the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative

proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6)

a

misrepresentation

by

[the] an employee whether or not it is

negligent or intentional;
(7)

or

results

from

riots,

unlawful

assemblies,

public

demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbance^;
(8)

or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;

(9)

the activities of the Utah National Guard;

(10)

the

incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or

city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11)

any natural

controlled

condition

on

[state—tands]

publicly

owned

or

lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned

mine or mining operation, or [as-the-resafct-of] any

activity

authorized

by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(12)

research

or

implementation of cloud management or seeding for

the clearing of fog; [or]
(13)

the

management

of

flood

waters,

earthquakes,

or

natural

flood

or storm

di sasters;
(14)

the

construction,

repair,

or

operation

of

systems;
(15)

the operation of an emergency vehicle, while

accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
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(16)
highway,

a

latent

road,

dangerous

street,

or

alley,

latent

defective

crosswalk,

sidewalk,

bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them;
(17)

condition

of

any

culvert, tunnel,

|

a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any

public

building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or
[{±3}] (18)

the activities of:

(a)

providing emergency medical assistance;

(b)

fighting fire;

(c)

regulating,

mitigating,

or

handling

hazardous

materials

or

hazardous wastes;
(d)

emergency evacuations; or

(e)

intervening during dam emergencies.

Section 5.

Section 63-30-10.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted

by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read:
63-30-10.5.

Waiver of immunity for taking private property without

compensation.
(1)

[frnmanity] As provided by Article I,

Constitution,

immunity

Section

22

of

the

Utah

from suit of all governmental entities is waived

for the recovery of compensation from the governmental

entity

when

the

governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses
without just compensation.
(2)

Compensation

and

damages

shall

be

assessed according to the

requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78, Eminent Domain.
Section 6.

Section 63-30-11,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953,

amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read:

-6-

as

last

